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Recent Decisions

CRIMINAL

LAW-EVIDENCE-COMPETENCY

OF MINOR

WITNESSES-OB-

OATH-The Pennsylvania Superior Court has held that in
the absence of an understanding and comprehension of an oath, and the
Divine punishment it implies, minor witnesses are incompetent to
testify.
LIGATION OF

Commonwealth v. Rimmel, 221 Pa. Super. 84, 289 A.2d 116 (1972).
Defendant, John A. Rimmel, was criminally convicted on two charges
of indecent assault. The conviction rested entirely upon the testimony
of two girl victims who were eight years old at the time of the trial.1
Prior to the trial the judge conducted an extensive voir dire examination in chambers to determine the competency of the witnesses to
testify. The judge ruled both competent.
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed 2 stating that
neither girl was competent to testify. In its opinion the superior court
declared there was no indication that either girl comprehended the
difference between truth and falsehood or that they sufficiently comprehended the solemnity of the oath.3 No appeal Was taken to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court for personal reasons expressed by the
parents of the female victims.
The court relied on Rosche v. McCoy. 4 In that case the court held
that competency should be determined in the discretion of the trial
judge once the fact of infancy becomes apparent to him. His discretion is not absolute but nevertheless will not be reversed in the
absence of abuse.5 In the present case the court went on to state that
this issue is not to be determined merely on the ability of the witness to
communicate his thoughts in terms of language. There must be a
capacity to understand questions and to frame and express intelligent
answers, a capacity to remember what it is one is being called to testify
about and a consciousness of the duty to speak the truth. 6
The court went on to state that the voir dire of the two girls showed
no comprehension, on the part of either, of the difference between truth
and falsehood. This statement is unfounded, especially in light of the
testimony the court footnotes in support of this contention.7
1. Commonwealth v. Rimmel, 221 Pa. Super. 84, 85, 289 A.2d 116, 117 (1972).
2. Id. at 89, 289 A.2d at 118.
3. Id. at 87, 289 A.2d at 118.
4. 397 Pa. 615, 156 A.2d 307 (1959).
5. Id. at 620, 156 A.2d at 310.
6. 221 Pa. Super. at 86, 289 A.2d at 117.
7. In support of this conclusion the court cited the following portions of the voir dire
examination in the footnotes to their opinion:
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•,More importantly the court concluded that neither girl showed "...
sufficient indication of a comprehension of the solemnity of the oath so
that a citizen of our Commonwealth may be sentenced or convicted as
a result of the testimony thereunder given." This belief was based on
the fact that the girls answered that they would be "beaten," as one
girl stated, or "hollered at" or "punished," as the other stated, in answer
to thequestion of what would happen to them if they told a lie. 9
The court in its opinion quoted with approval a passage from Wigmore's treatise, On Evidence, which explains the reason why a witness is
required to swear an oath before being allowed to testify. 10 Wigmore
explains" that the earlier theory of the oath was an objective • teIst in
which the witnes's summoned Divine vengeance for lying, Whereby when
the witness is seen standing unharmed all present know that the Divine
judgment has pronounced the witness to be a truth-teller. 12 Today,
Wigmore explains, the oath is believed to be a method of reminding
the witness strongly of the Divine punishment somewhere in store for
lying, and thus of putting the witness in a frame of mind calculated
to speak only the truth as the witness believes it to be.'s
In regard to comprehension of truth and falsehood, Cynthya McNamara 'stated,
"THE COURT: All right. Do you know that you are supposed to. tell :the truth?
CINDY MCNAMARA: Yes. THE COURT: Do you. tell' the truth all the time?
CINDY MCNAMARA: Yes." and.Linda McNamara stated, "THE COURT: Linda, do
you know that ,you are supposed to tell the truth all the time? LINDA MCNAMARA:
Yes. THE COURT: Do you try to tell the truth all the time? LINDA MCNAMARA:
Yes."
Id. at 86 n.1, 289 A.2d at 117 n.l.
8. id. at 87, 289 A.2d at i18.
9. In support of this the court cited the following portion of the voir dire examination
in the footnotes to- their opinion:
In regard to understanding of the. obligation of an oath, Cynthya McNamara stated:
"THE COURT: Do you know [what] it means to take an oath, to raise your hand to
God. Do you know what that means? CINDY MCNAMARA: No. THE COURT: Okay.
Well, that means that you are asking God to witness that you are telling the truth.
You are asking God to be the one who sees that you tell the truth. Do you understand
that? CINDY MCNAMARA: Yes." and Linda McNamara stated: "THE COURT:
Now, -do you know what happens if you tell a lie? LINDA MCNAMARA: Yes. THE
COURT: Okay. What happens? LINDA MCNAMARA: You get beaten. THE COURT:
Okay. You mean your mother or 'your teacher gives you a beating? LINDA MCNAMARA: Yes. THE COURT: Do you know it is wrong to tell a lie? LINDA MCNAMARA: No. THE COURT: Well, you don't? Do you tell lies? Do you understand my
question? That's all right, you are among friends. We are all friends. I told you I have
a girl like you. Do you try to tell the truth all the time? LINDA MCNAMARA: Yes."
Id at 86-87 n.2, 289 A.2d at'117-18 n.2..
10. Id. at 87-88, 289 A.2d at 118.
11. 6 J. WIGMORE, ON EVIDENCE § 1816 (3d ed. 1940).
12. Wigmore in a footnote cites a number of seventeenth century English cases in support of this history. Id. § 1816, at 285 n.l.
13. See note 11 supra.
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As long ago as 1905, in Commonwealth v. Furmdn14 the Pennsyl
vania Supreme Court declared that a minor witness need not know
of the existence of some Divine punishment awaiting him for false
swearing. In that case the lower court allowed, over the objections
of the defendants, an eight-year-old boy to testify in a murder prosecution after it appeared to the satisfaction of the court that the witness
was competent. 15 On appeal, the supreme court stated that in this
enlightened age courts should discard the notion that a child must
know about theoretical concepts of Divine punishment before being
allowed to testify. A witness need only know that he is expected to tell
the truth and that some punishment will follow a violation.' 6 Additionally, it was in Furman that the court first espoused a test of competency
which was to be followed in all future cases and to which the superior
court in Rimmel gave lip service. The witness must clearly comprehend
the difference between truth and falsehood, and his duty to tell the
7
truth.'
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court next considered the question of the
competency of a minor to testify in Piepke v. Philadelphia& Reading
Ry.'5 where the court reversed and remanded 9 a lower court determination of incompetency of a minor witness to testify about a train accident
in which the witness' playmate was seriously injured by a train backing
up. The court, noting that there was no controlling statute in Pennsylvania disqualifying witnesses because of infancy, stated that the
witness need only demonstrate a capacity to recall the incident he is to
testify to, to understand the question put to him and give rational
answers to these questions, and to know that he ought to speak the
14. 211 Pa. 549, 60 A. 1089 (1905).
15. The voir dire examination cited in the opinion of the court with regard to competency was as follows:
Q. Do you know what it is to tell the truth? A. Yes.
Q. Suppose you don't tell it, what will become of you? Do they tell you in Sunday
school? What do they say, if you tell lies? where will you go to? Do you know? A. No.
Q. Do you know whether you must tell the truth or not? A. Yes.
Id. at 549, 60 A. at 1089.
16. Id. at 550, 60 A. at 1090.
17. 221 Pa. Super. at 86, 289 A.2d at 117 (emphasis added).
The substantial test of the competency of an infant witness is his intelligence,'and his
comprehension of an obligation to tell the truth. The truth is what the law, under
the rules of evidence, is seeking, and if afull and present understanding of the obligation to tell it is shown by the witness, the nature of his conception of the obligation
is of secondary importance.
211 Pa. at 550, 60 A. at 1089.
18. 242 Pa. 321, 89 A. 124 (1913).
19. Id. at 329, 89 A. at 126.
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truth.20 For the latter qualification the court cited the test enunciated
in Furman as controlling.2'
In the Delaware County case of Sherkus v. Radbi122 the judge relied
on the Furman and Piepke opinions in holding two boys, ages eight
and ten, competent to testify about a collision involving a playmate and
a passing truck. The case is interesting because of facts quite similar to
the present case concerning the witnesses' answers to questions asked
to determine competency. The older boy stated that he was punished
for lying. 23 The younger boy while knowing nothing of the nature -of
the oath knew that he was expected to tell the truth, but could not
explain what telling the truth meant or what would happen to a boy
who did not tell the truth. He knew, however, what always happened
to him when he told a lie, stating that his parents would "whip" him. 24
In 1948 the Pennsylvania Superior Court held a six-year-old female
victim of sexual assault competent to testify, citing the Furman and
Piepke tests. 25 In that case the witness comprehended her duty to tell
26
the truth knowing that she was punished for not doing so.
27
In the following year the court decided Commonwealth v. Carne
in which a seven-year-old was considered competent to testify as a
witness to an automobile accident, utilizing the same test of competency that the courts of this Commonwealth have been using since
1905 when Furman was decided.28 In Carnes the question of competency in the trial was not raised until cross-examination of the witness
at which time the objection of plaintiff's counsel to the untimely
questioning was sustained. 29 On appeal, the superior court stated that
while there was not specific questioning on the witness' ability to
distinguish between truth and falsity and his obligation to tell the truth
the trial judge's conclusion of competency will not be disturbed since
much must be left to his discretion.80 The trial judge had made his
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
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Id. at 328, 89 A. at 125 (emphasis added).
Id. at 329, 89 A. at 126.
19 Del. Co. 620 (Pa. C.P. 1929).
Id. at 621.
Id.
Commonwealth v. Allabaugh, 162 Pa. Super. 490, 58 A.2d 184 (1948).
Id. at 492, 58 A.2d at 185-86.
165 Pa. Super. 53, 67 A.2d 675 (1949).
211 Pa. 549, 60 A. 1089 (1905).
165 Pa. Super. 53, 59, 67 A.2d 675, 678 (1949).
Id. at 59, 67 A.2d at 678.
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decision of competency based on having heard generally the questions
asked of the witness and the answers given by him.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court thoroughly summarized the law
concerning minor witnesses in Rosche v. McCoy,3 1 which, as mentioned previously, was the sole precedent relied on by the court in
the present case. In Rosche the court synthesized and refined the
decisions in Furman and Piepke, stating three requirements the trial
judge should apply in exercising his discretionary power to rule on the
competency of minor witnesses to testify. A child of tender years should
possess:
(1) such capacity to communicate, including as it does both an
ability to understand questions and to frame and express intelligent answers, (2) a mental capacity to observe the occurrence
itself and the capacity of remembering what it is the witness is
called to 32
testify about, and (3) a consciousness of the duty to speak
the truth.
The case dealt with the competency of a seven-year-old girl to testify
about an accident she had witnessed when she was four years old. It
was the first case in Pennsylvania in which a minor witness was asked
to testify to events which happened years earlier. As a result, the court
on appeal reversed the trial judge's determination of competency stating
that the witness failed to qualify on the first and second criteria for
determining competency33 Nowhere in Rosche was the third criterion,
a consciousness of the duty to speak the truth, equated with the requirement that the witness be "aware of the responsibilities of taking
an oath" or that the witness show "sufficient indication of a comprehension of the solemnity of the oath" as was required by the superior
court of the two minor witnesses in Rimmel.34 To the contrary, the
court in Rosche implied that the modern trend has demonstrated a
5
lessening of the importance of the oath in the case of infant witnesses.
31. 397 Pa. 615, 156 A.2d 307 (1959).
32. Id. at 620-21, 156 A.2d at 319 (emphasis added).
33. The court stated:
It is obvious that had [the witness] been called . . . at the time of this occurrence,
when she was but 4 years of age, she would have been incompetent. Carolyn's memory
of the event and its details did not, indeed it could not, improve as time went on. The
only thing that did improve was her capacity to communicate in terms of words. But
that capacity is meaningless unless supported by the capacity to note the occurrence
at the time it happened and the ability to remember it.
Id. at 621-22, 156 A.2d at 310.
34. 221 Pa. Super. at 87, 289 A.2d at 118.
35. 397 Pa. at 620, 156 A.2d at 310.
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The Rimmel court read something into the Rosche decision which
simply was not there.
It is suggested that the decision in Rimmel represents a return by
the superior court, in contravention to all precedent since 1905, to a
long discarded requirement that a minor witness know the nature,
importance, and solemnity of the oath. Failing qualification under this
test, the witness is incompetent to testify according to the superior
court's holding.
The ramifications of this decision are numerous, especially in criminal cases. It would seem that defense counsel will enjoy the benefits of
this decision almost exclusively. It is seriously doubted that there exist
many potential witnesses of tender age that have any idea of the significance of the oath. Many children who would otherwise qualify as
competent because they know that they should be predisposed to truthtelling will be prohibited from rendering intelligent testimony of what
they witnessed. This will preclude not only those minors who visually
perceive the occurrence to which they are testifying, but also all the
unfortunate victims of crimes which are perpetrated against them, as
in Rimmel.
In the Allegheny County Common Pleas Court, Criminal Division,
a case, which remains unreported, was recently concluded where the
judge, using the Rimmel test, held that a twelve-year-old was incompetent to testify in a murder case in which he witnessed the crime. 80
Fortunately, the prosecution secured a conviction without the aid of
the minor witness' testimony but the result will not always be the same
in the future.
•-In Pennsylvania a minor is presumed incompetent to testify until
the age of fourteen. 37 It is suggested that it may be only a matter of time
before an otherwise intelligent and competent fourteen-year-old will
be adjudged incompetent for failing to understand the significance of
the oath according to the Rimmel standard.
The Rimmel standard represents a return to an archaic idea that
witnesses must know the significance of an oath. One objective of the
American system of justice through the trial of a case in an adversary
proceeding is the ascertainment of truth. It should be sufficient that
minor witnesses be predisposed to truth-telling to allow their testimony
to be given.
36. Commonwealth v. Bundy, Criminal Nos. 8060-61 (Pa. C.P. Alleg. Co., July 21, 1972)
(argued before Judge Clark in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas).
37. Rosche v. McCoy, 397 Pa. 615, 621, 156 A.2d 307, 310 (1959).

706

Recent Decisions
The Rimmel case should be overruled so that the courts can return
to.the state's traditional common sense standard to adjudge competency
of minor witnesses to testify.
Stephen Levin

CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION-COMMITMENT OF INCOMPETENT DEFENDANT-The Supreme Court of the

United States has held that Indiana's commitment of an incompetent
defendant solely on the basis of his incapacity to stand trial violated the
defendant's rights of equal protection and due process.
Jackson v. Indiana,406 U.S. 715 (1972).
Jackson, a twenty-seven-year-old illiterate deaf mute with the mental
capacity of a pre-school child, was arrested and charged with robbery.
Before trial he was committed to the Indiana Department of Mental
Health as incompetent to stand trial.' Jackson's counsel filed a motion
for a new trial, arguing that commitment until Jackson was competent
to stand trial 2 amounted to a life sentence 3 without his ever having been
convicted of a crime. Jackson's counsel :contended that this violated
Jackson's rights of due process and equal .protection. 4 The trial court
denied the motion. 5 On appeal the Supreme Court of Indiana affirmed. 6
1. IND. CoDE §§ 35-5-3-2 (1971) provides:
When at any time before the trial of any criminal cause ... the court ... has reasonable ground for believing the defendant to be insane, he shall immediately fix a time
for a hearing to determine the question of the defendant's sanity .... If the court
shall find that the defendant has not comprehension sufficient to understand the
proceedings and make his defense, the trial shall be delayed or continued on the
alleged insanity of the defendant . . . . []he court shall order the defendant committed ....
Whenever the defendant shall become sane the superintendent of the
state psychiatric hospital shall certify the fact to the proper court, who shall enter an
order .

directing the sheriff to return the defendant .... Upon the return to court

of any defendant so committed he or she shall then be placed upon trial ....
2. Although IND. CODE § 35-5-3-2 (1971) refers to the defendant's "sanity," the term is
not defined. The Court read the word as if it were synonomous with competence to stand
trial.
3. One examining doctor testified at the hearing that it was very unlikely that Jackson
could ever learn to read and write or develop proficiency in sign language. He testified that
Jackson's prognosis was dim. The other examining doctor testified that even if Jackson
were not a deaf-mute, he would be incompetent to stand trial. He doubted that Jackson
could ever develop the necessary communication skills. An interpreter from a state school
for the deaf testified that Indiana had no facilities to teach Jackson the necessary communication skills. 406 U.S. at 718.
4. Jackson's counsel also contended that the commitment violated Jackson's eighth
amendment rights. However, the Court did not decide on this issue. Id. at 739.
5. Id. at 719.
6. 253 Ind. 487, 255 N.E.2d 515 (1970).
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